• Informational Design of Conscious Entities

Informatica 28 (2004) 1–12 1
Informational Design of Conscious Entities
ˇ
Anton P. Zeleznikar
Volariˇ eva ul. 8, Ljubljana, SI–1111
c
s51em@hamradio.si
Keywords: definitions, informational design, informational consciousness, informational methodology, metaphysicalistic
organization, thesaural approach
Received: June 8, 2004
Thesaural approach to entities’ metaphysicalistic organization is shown within the design of an informa-
tional consciousness system.
Besides phenomenal, psychological, biological, quantum-mechanical, artificial, and other possible def-
initions of consciousness, the informational consciousness (IC) is outlined as a major autonomous subsys-
tem necessary in any conscious system. It is impossible to imagine a kind of the beyond to the informational
phenomenalism in brain, nature, cosmos, and artifact. IC is founded formally by its own informational ax-
iomatism, formulas, formula systems, schemes, scheme systems, graphs, and other constructive means
and, within this theory and implementation possibilities, remains clearly scientifically disciplined. More
actually, IC systems can be designed by the proposed informational methodology and implemented within
existing complex computer systems and informational nets.
November 22, 2004
1 Definitions of different sorts of LC: local consciousness,
GC: global consciousness,
consciousness CC: cosmological consciousness,
QtC: quantum-theoretical consciousness,
A precise and exhaustive definition of consciousness does AC: artificial consciousness,
IC: informational consciousness,
not exist at all. Definitions can emerge according to the AIC: artificial informational consciousness, etc.
research of brain, mind, cognition, emotions, motivation,
and other ingredients of the consciousness complex. There These sorts of consciousness represent the majority of con-
are loose attempts stating a few commonly accepted prin- cepts known nowadays. 2
ciples within the concept of consciousness. Definitional
distinguishing among philosophical consciousness, artifi- Assumption 2 Consciousness concerns an object or a
cial consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, psycho- complex of objects and emerges out of the subconscious or
Preprint
logical consciousness, biological consciousness, quantum- unconscious background, being the possible informational
mechanical consciousness, informational consciousness, space. The substance of any sort of consciousness is infor-
and other sorts of consciousness is possible. mational and, within the informational, consciousness-like
Definitions of consciousness can substantially differ in components can emerge being organized consciously. 2
different languages. The philosophical background dic-
This assumption does not deviate essentially from known
tates the inclination to such or another definition together
definitions of consciousness. As an exception the infor-
with different views of research and the emerging science
mational view of consciousness may be understood which,
of consciousness. Let us make a short list of possible def-
however, seems to be evident.
initions explicitly concerning consciousness of such or an-
other sort. In a way, major consciousness components like Assumption 3 Consciousness is generally regarded to be
cognition and emotions should be incorporated in the rough a conscious system with abilities or components represent-
forms of definition. ing conscious properties. One of the major system compo-
Instead with definitions we start with the assumptions of nents is self-awareness or self-consciousness, the ability to
the following sort. perceive the component by itself. Perception as a conscious
Assumption 1 From the research point of view different component perceives the relation between component and
sorts of consciousness can be distinguished: component environment. 2
InC: individual (human, animal) consciousness, To repeat: Informational consciousness seems to be
BC: biological consciousness, the essential component or property of any consciousness
PhC: phenomenal consciousness,
system. We experience how the phenomenal conscious-
PhiC: philosophical consciousness (phenomenology),
PsC: psychological consciousness, ness the consciousness in the living human brain has its
SC: social consciousness, evident informational roots, for instance, in pure linguistic
2 Informatica 28 (2004) 1–12 ˇ
Anton P. Zeleznikar
experience, where memory performs as an associative stor- common operands, the informonic-entroponic spaces
age of learned and experienced information. Phenomenol- z, z and αi , αi in the form
ogy in philosophy performs as a literary information and,  
in this view, as informational phenomenology. z, z ;
 
 αi , αi ;
Φ (z, z)

 
 i = 1, 2, . . . , n; 
2 Informational consciousness n